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Introduction and summary
Central counterparties (CCPs) are structures that help 
facilitate the clearing and settlement process in finan-
cial markets. They have long been utilized in the de-
rivatives markets, more recently have been adopted in 
cash securities markets, and currently are experiencing 
a growing interest in a further expansion of their use. 
Typical examples of CCPs in the U.S. include the clear-
inghouses for the derivatives markets in Chicago—
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Clearing House, 
the Options Clearing Corporation, and the Clearing 
Corporation.1 Examples in the European Union include 
LCH.Clearnet and Eurex Clearing. A more compre-
hensive, but non-exhaustive, list of U.S. and European 
central counterparties, with characteristics of each ar-
rangement, is included in Bliss and Papathanassiou 
(2006) and reproduced in appendix 1. 
What are the benefits associated with CCPs?  
If properly structured, they can offer more effective 
risk-management procedures than is possible in mar-
kets that do not use central clearing and settlement ar-
rangements, resulting in superior safety and soundness. 
This, in turn, can lead to increased liquidity and deep-
er markets. 
How are these gains realized? The CCP interpos-
es itself between the counterparties to a financial con-
tract. Thus, the CCP becomes the counterparty to each 
side of the contract. A transaction initiated between 
customer X and customer Y becomes two separate 
contracts: one between X and the CCP and one between 
Y and the CCP. If the CCP has appropriate risk-man-
agement processes in place, this “substitution” of the 
CCP as the common counterparty to each transaction 
results in a decrease in counterparty risk.2 Because 
traders are exposed only to counterparty risk from the 
CCP, they need not spend time and resources evaluating 
and managing the risk of other market participants—
a job that is performed instead by the CCP. In fact, 
traders in a centrally cleared market that uses a CCP 
are completely indifferent to the identity of other 
market participants, a fact that leads to anonymous 
trading. This decreases transaction costs and contrib-
utes to an increase in market liquidity. In addition, 
since the CCP is the common counterparty to each 
trade, the CCP framework naturally allows for multi-
lateral netting of positions, which leads to additional 
decreases in transaction costs.
In recent years, we have seen significant changes 
in the financial markets for which CCPs are utilized. 
Trading volumes have surged, new financial products 
have been developed, technology has gotten cheaper 
and become more fully incorporated into the clearing 
and settlement process, and electronic trading has in-
creased. Risk-management procedures have improved, 
cross-border trading activity has increased, and ex-
changes and clearinghouses have consolidated. These 
developments have had important implications for 
CCP operations, ownership, and governance. While 
CCPs have traditionally served one market in one 
country, they have more recently expanded to serve 
multiple markets across national borders. The interest 
of traders in a more efficient use of collateral tends to 
reinforce this trend and adds to the impetus for a re-
consideration of CCP structures. 
In response to this growing interest in CCPs, the 
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Central Bank sponsored a joint conference on “Issues 
Related to Central Counterparty Clearing” on April 3 
and 4, 2006, in Frankfurt, Germany. The conference 
featured a multidisciplinary “law and economics” dis-
cussion of key legal, risk-management, and public 
policy issues associated with CCPs, with a special 
emphasis on issues that arise in cross-border and 
cross-product transactions.
Over the two-day conference a number of indus-
try executives, policymakers, and research econo-
mists evaluated an array of topics associated with 
CCPs, including:3 
n   Efficiency and systemic importance of current and 
evolving CCP structures, including ownership and 
governance structures; 
n   Management of credit, liquidity, operational, legal, 
and other risks by CCPs; 
n   Mutualization of counterparty credit risk; 
n   Costs and benefits of CCP structures; 
n   Innovation, competition, and integration initiatives 
among CCPs; 
n   Relationships between central banks and CCPs 
and their clearing participants; 
n   Similarities and differences in the potential for using 
CCPs in over-the-counter (OTC) and exchange-
traded products;
n   Cross-product clearing; and
n   Policy issues related to the design, operation, over-
sight, and supervision of CCPs.
This article provides an overview of the conference 
and an introduction to this special conference issue of 
Economic Perspectives. Next, in an article that builds on 
the discussion at the conference, Robert Bliss and Robert 
Steigerwald discuss common problems of risk man-
agement, operational efficiency, liquidity support, and 
information that are inherent in both exchange-traded 
and OTC derivatives markets. The article discusses 
typical clearing and settlement arrangements for those 
markets and compares the bilateral clearing arrange-
ments typically found in OTC markets with markets that 
utilize centralized clearing arrangements, such as CCPs. 
The remainder of the issue features presentations 
by the keynote speakers, Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, 
member of the Executive Board of the European Cen-
tral Bank; Randall S. Kroszner, governor, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Finance of Italy and former member of the Executive 
Board of the European Central Bank; Michael H. 
Moskow, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago; and Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the 
European Central Bank. Given their inclusion in this 
special issue, little coverage of the keynote addresses 
is included in this summary article. 
Foundations of central clearing parties 
Setting the stage
A CCP imposes itself as the legal counterparty to 
every trade.4 This substitution of the counterparties by 
the CCP typically occurs through a process known as 
novation, which discharges the contracts between the 
original trading entities and creates two new, legally 
binding contracts—one between each of the original 
trading parties and the CCP. 
This arrangement places the CCP in a unique po-
sition in that it has direct interaction and counterparty 
risk exposure with each trading party.5 This gives the 
CCP the incentive to closely monitor traders, as well 
as access to the information needed to manage its risk. 
Market participants, by contrast, are essentially indif-
ferent to the creditworthiness of anyone but the CCP, 
which significantly decreases the cost of risk monitor-
ing. This is typically considered the most important 
role of the CCP: what John Trundle (2006) of Euro-
clear SA/NV called the “collective investment of the 
market in risk management.” 
The CCP uses a variety of tools to manage risk. 
First, it can establish membership requirements, includ-
ing capital requirements, which the members must 
satisfy to continue to participate in the arrangement. 
Again, this eliminates the need for individual partici-
pants to be concerned with the risk of the trading part-
ners, because they know that participants must satisfy 
certain minimum standards to continue to participate 
in the centrally cleared market. 
The most common tool used to manage risk, and 
many would argue the single most important, is collat-
eral. CCPs typically hold collateral (sometimes called 
initial margin) from each market participant to serve 
as a cushion against adverse market fluctuations. The 
CCP also monitors the position of members and may 
periodically require additional collateral following 
market movements to reestablish an acceptable cush-
ion against future losses. Rules are established dictat-
ing what assets are allowed to serve as collateral, how 
much of a “haircut” should be given to specific assets 
in determining their value as collateral, and how often 
margin calls should take place.6 Some have argued that 
the single most important reason for the existence of 
CCPs is to have them serve as a collateral facility.7 
CCPs also typically require members to make 
periodic payments (sometimes called variation margin) 
to prevent a buildup of market losses. Payments equal-
ing the “mark-to-market” from a recent settlement 4 4Q/006, Economic Perspectives
price—often the closing price from the previous trad-
ing day—are made to the CCP by those traders whose 
positions have lost value as a result of market fluctua-
tions. The CCP, in turn, makes payments that, in ef-
fect, pass through market gains to those traders 
whose positions have gained value as a result of mar-
ket fluctuations. This process of exchanging variation 
margin permits the CCP to set collateral requirements 
as low as possible while maintaining its value as a 
cushion against future losses. 
CCPs also use loss-sharing arrangements to cover 
any additional losses incurred beyond those covered 
by a defaulting trader’s collateral. Mutualization of 
losses is a final layer of protection that insures the 
ability of the CCP to perform its obligations notwith-
standing the failure of one or more traders. This also 
should reduce the potential spillover effects on other 
members when individual members in the arrange-
ment fail, since the combined group should be better 
able to absorb losses. There is a realization, however, 
that mutualization may encourage market participants 
using a CCP to trade more and establish larger posi-
tions, increasing the potential risk for the CCP, and 
that decisions concerning loss allocation procedures 
have distributional effects that must be considered 
when developing the loss-sharing arrangement. For 
example, setting high (low) margin requirements 
shifts the burden of individual firm failure toward the 
defaulting (surviving) firms. Collateral is expensive 
and imposes costs on all CCP participants. Clearly, 
the perceived value to the members must offset the 
potential cost before the specifics of the loss-sharing 
arrangement can be agreed upon. 
The CCPs unique position of being a common, sub-
stituted counterparty to all trades in a centrally cleared 
market greatly simplifies the multilateral netting of 
trade obligations. Past studies have shown that multi-
lateral netting can result in significant decreases in 
risk exposure relative to the underlying gross positions—
reductions exceeding 90 percent in some cases.8  This 
contributes to improved liquidity and deeper markets. 
As a result of the centralization of information 
flows and the standardization of processes, a CCP in 
a centrally cleared market may enjoy economies of 
scale and/or scope in the performance of these risk-
management functions. For similar reasons, it may 
also realize economies of scale in the provision of ad-
ditional administrative services, which may generate 
cost savings. Consider, for example, the default of a 
trader with outstanding contracts in a market that is 
not centrally cleared. Each of the defaulting trader’s 
counterparties must take steps—such as closing out 
open positions, liquidating collateral, and, if necessary, 
instituting legal action—to protect itself against loss-
es arising from the default. In a centrally cleared mar-
ket, however, the CCP acts on behalf of all users of 
the market in taking actions to protect itself against 
loss from a trader’s default. Finally, there may also be 
cost advantages in the centralization of various back-
office services, such as trade capture, trade matching, 
reporting requirements, netting calculations, central-
ized collateral valuation, and settlement services for 
CCP members. 
What does the market want from CCPs?
Diana Chan (2006) from Citigroup started the 
conference discussion by describing how market par-
ticipants want to see the CCP environment evolve.  
At the time of the conference, Citigroup was a mem-
ber of 38 different CCPs worldwide. Many of Chan’s 
points were echoed by other conference participants 
throughout the conference. 
Chan (2006) stated that the role of CCPs could 
be expected to grow in the foreseeable future and that 
new ones would be developed to bring about the asso-
ciated benefits in other markets. She observed that CCPs 
create a virtual cycle in growing transaction volumes 
as they increase participants’ ability to trade through 
a netting process that reduces both regulatory capital 
requirements and the number of trades to be settled. 
However, while CCPs are thought to create sig-
nificant benefits, the proliferation of disjointed CCPs 
creates potential problems. As the number of CCPs 
grows, the coordination cost involved in operating in 
multiple arrangements increases. Additional pools of 
collateral must be held and managed, and administra-
tive costs increase as firms need to work with multi-
ple infrastructures having potentially different legal 
environments, controls, compliance procedures, and 
processes.9 Ideally, the heterogeneity across CCPs 
would be decreased. While this could be achieved in 
a number of ways, including CCP consolidation, pro-
cessing harmonization, linkages across CCPs, and CCP 
cross-memberships, most of the discussion over the 
two-day conference concentrated on the recent ground-
swell, particularly in Europe, for CCP consolidation.
Chan emphasized that as consolidation occurs, 
the market will have to invest heavily to adapt tech-
nology and reconfigure processes. However, these ex-
penditures could be justified if they result in internal 
efficiency gains and maintain an adequate degree of 
safety. These safety concerns underscored the need 
for uniform regulatory standards, particularly unifor-
mity across borders, and Chan said she welcomed the 
recent best practice recommendations for CCPs.10 How-
ever, she suggested there might be a need to go even  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
further in a number of respects. For example, CCPs 
could be required to be as robust as top tier banks, 
meaning they would be subject to the Basel Accord’s 
capital adequacy requirements. This is not uniformly 
the case—in some countries CCPs are considered banks, 
while in others they are considered clearinghouses, 
with correspondingly different regulatory requirements. 
Chan also offered a wish list of additional safety 
issues that Citigroup was interested in including in 
future CCP arrangements, such as capped loss-sharing 
for each counterparty when loss-sharing arrangements 
are negotiated, firewalls between asset classes to pro-
tect participants from potential losses in markets for 
assets they may not use, the ability to opt out of using 
the CCP for certain products and instead use other 
means (perhaps bilateral arrangements) to access the 
product, and differentiated rules for general clearing 
members that may differ from those of associate mem-
bers. The desire was to realize the full benefits of the 
CCP arrangement and to realize and address the spe-
cific needs of various segments of the CCP membership.
What does the regulator want from CCPs?
As discussed above, CCPs may generate signifi-
cant benefits by supporting the netting of positions, 
providing procedural standards, increasing market li-
quidity, and allowing for enhanced risk management. 
However, while risks on these arrangements may be 
shifted to the CCP, they are not eliminated. Instead 
risk becomes concentrated at the CCP, which becomes 
a potential source of systemic risk. Additionally, when 
the risks are shifted to the CCP and potential losses 
are mutualized, the incentives of participants may 
change, and moral hazard makes them more willing 
to take on additional risks. The financial regulatory 
authorities, therefore, have a significant interest in en-
suring that risk is well managed. Based on economic 
theory, this is a classic case where there is an eco-
nomic justification for regulatory involvement. 
Stated differently, Trundle (2006) emphasized 
the need for a role for regulatory authorities based on 
their unique perspective of market activity. He argued 
that CCP participants will focus mainly on the manage-
ment of day-to-day risks, and the public authorities 
will place more emphasis on the potential for extreme 
events (with systemic implications). These are low 
probability, but exceptionally high impact, events in 
the tails of the probability distribution. Given the mu-
tualization of risk, CCP participants may have an in-
herent tendency to underestimate the probability of 
these types of events, since the cost of protecting 
against such remote events falls principally upon the 
group of participants. This tendency supports a role 
for the public sector.
There appeared to be almost complete agreement 
among conference participants in favor of some regu-
latory oversight of CCPs.11 At a minimum, most agreed 
that there is value in having regulators play a role  
as coordinators to bring market participants together 
to develop best practices and standards for CCPs.  
The example most frequently cited in support of this 
coordinator role was the recent development of CCP 
recommendations by the Task Force on Securities 
Settlement Systems.12 Given the growing interest in 
CCPs and the interest in expanding them across both 
countries and products, the recommendations were 
developed to help promote safety and stability in finan-
cial markets as CCPs expand. The Task Force’s report 
addressed the major types of risk that CCPs encoun-
ter and provided general recommendations to manage 
these risks. The report also includes a methodology 
for assessing how well the recommendations have 
been implemented at CCPs. The recommendations 
are included in appendix 3. 
The recommendations were embraced by most of 
the conference participants and were making inroads 
into practice. In fact, Yvon Lucas (2006) of Banque de 
France discussed a recent assessment of LCH.Clearnet 
against the CPSS–IOSCO standards. LCH.Clearnet is 
a multi-product CCP that serves exchanges in Paris, 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and London. It also 
has a link to the Italian CCP Cassadi Compensazione 
e Garanzia. LCH.Clearnet is subject to “cooperative 
oversight” based on Memoranda of Understanding 
with authorities in countries where it provides services. 
For the purpose of the assessment, Banque de France 
coordinated the contributions of the various regulato-
ry authorities. 
The assessment was performed using the method-
ology of the CPSS–IOSCO framework and was based 
on available data supplemented by interviews. For 
most of the recommendations, the assessment was 
considered straightforward and the overall result was 
that LCH.Clearnet was generally in compliance with 
the standards. In the areas where deficiencies were 
found, LCH.Clearnet was asked to provide an action 
plan to improve future compliance. 
However, the exercise brought out a number of 
issues that other CCPs may find problematic in per-
forming their own assessments. For example, how 
should links to other CCPs be treated relative to other 
membership relationships, given the unique nature  
of these links? The thought was that CCP links bring 
very different risks into play than those brought by 
other participants. Additionally, there was a feeling 
that certain recommendations—particularly those 
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to interpretation. Finally, some felt terms, such as 
“normal market conditions,” should be more clearly 
defined. Generally, however, the standards were seen 
as a valuable first step in assessing the resiliency of 
CCPs and in guiding their evolution. 
Discussion of the major issues
The conference presentations and discussion fre-
quently returned to the issues of CCP consolidation, 
the appropriate public policy role in the evolution of 
CCPs, governance issues, and risk management. 
Consolidation
Many participants expressed a desire to take ad-
vantage of potential economies of scale and economies 
of scope from CCP consolidation, thereby significant-
ly reducing the number of CCPs, particularly across 
Europe. Lucas (2006) argued that consolidation was 
probably the single most important issue facing the 
industry today. There were differences of opinion, 
however, on the perceived benefits of consolidation, 
the tradeoffs associated with it, and how the process 
should proceed. 
Alberto Giovannini (2006) of Unifortune Asset 
Management SGR and others insisted that fixed cost 
within CCPs made up the bulk of operational expenses 
and that the marginal cost of clearing and settlement 
operations was essentially zero over a wide range of 
output levels. Thus, there were obvious reasons for 
consolidation, since the industry has the textbook char-
acteristics of a natural monopoly. This aligned well with 
a general view by many European market participants 
that it is an opportune time to break down current bar-
riers and encourage cross-border and cross-product 
consolidation with a goal of a single European CCP.13
Some speakers, however, did question the extent 
of the benefits that could be realized from consolida-
tion. In response to the claim that marginal costs  
were zero, Daniel Gisler of Eurex, David Hardy of 
LCH.Clearnet Limited, and Kimberly Taylor of the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange stressed in their panel 
discussion that all costs were not fixed and, although 
low, marginal costs were not zero. Gisler (2006) indi-
cated that personnel costs could change, and expendi-
tures directed at innovation were significant and 
“lumpy” as CCP activity increases. 
However, most of the disagreement centered on the 
role of competition in determining the direction of in-
dustry consolidation. The audience tended to fall into 
two general camps: one supporting the idea that com-
petition should be the driving force leading industry 
structure and consolidation, and the other indicating 
that competition in the industry “was not real” and ar-
tificial barriers stood in the way of a movement toward 
a single CCP with natural monopoly characteristics.14 
The former camp emphasized that it was not  
obvious that there is a need for public authorities in 
Europe to push for consolidation of clearinghouses. 
Private entities operating in their own self-interest 
should be allowed to determine whether consolida-
tion would, on net, be beneficial to stakeholders.  
With any movement toward a more concentrated in-
dustry, certain parties will benefit from the change and 
others will be harmed. The views of all stakeholders, 
including the CCP owners, users, full members, and 
associate members, as well as large and small partici-
pants, should be considered. The marketplace is prob-
ably best situated to allow the net benefits to be analyzed 
and decisions made as to how industry structure should 
change. Competition across CCPs does exist, as does 
competition between CCPs and alternative clearing 
mechanisms, such as those used for over-the-counter 
products. The marketplace should determine how to 
proceed. 
The “pro-coordination” camp held that, to a great 
extent, CCPs have developed as “silos” because of 
unique legal characteristics and other peculiarities of 
the countries in which they operate. Economies do 
exist, but cannot be exploited as long as these nation-
al barriers remain in place. Competition will not drive 
the industry toward the optimal structure because each 
CCP has monopoly-like control over the market it 
serves. The potential cost savings from decreasing the 
number of CCPs in Europe to one or two are so great 
that coordination may be justified to overcome barri-
ers to consolidation. 
Another difference between the two camps is in 
the type of inefficiency they identify. The “pro-con-
solidation” camp takes the view that significant econ-
omies of scale could be exploited if consolidation 
took place because, they assert, CCPs have natural 
monopoly characteristics. Per unit costs could be driv-
en significantly lower with consolidation. 
An alternative form of efficiency that the other 
camp is considering is technical efficiency, which is a 
measure of how effective management is at operating 
efficiently, given the current scale of operations. Stat-
ed differently, economies of scale are captured by a 
movement along a declining average cost relationship 
as output is increased and is a function of the produc-
tion process. Technical efficiency is a measure of how 
close firms are to operating on the average cost rela-
tionship, where the cost relationship is representative 
of the best practices in the industry and is a function 
of the effectiveness of management. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
In banking in the U.S., technical efficiency has 
been shown to dominate scale inefficiency.15 This 
may or may not be the case for CCPs, but certain 
speakers expressed concern that technical inefficien-
cy might offset any efficiencies that may be realized 
from increasing the scale of production. Taylor (2006), 
for example, questioned any policy encouraging the 
development of a monopoly, since history has shown 
monopolies to be relatively slow in innovating and 
notoriously poor in providing high quality service. She 
gave the example of the Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV) in the U.S., where state governments monop-
olize the provision of automobile drivers’ licenses. 
Taylor said she did not “believe many people think  
of the DMV as a model of efficiency.” 
A possible alternative to CCP consolidation would 
be to have some form of interoperability through link-
ages across CCPs. This could take the form of CCPs 
having memberships with other CCPs in an attempt 
to allow participants in any one of the linked organi-
zations to have indirect access to each of the other 
linked organizations. While this was generally viewed 
as being suboptimal, it was considered a possible in-
termediate step before actual changes took place in 
industry structure. Hardy (2006) argued that while 
some “spaghetti” form of interoperability would like-
ly gravitate toward one CCP in the longer run, the 
market might accept this as a short-term, second-best 
solution. However, concerns were also expressed about 
the potential costs of moving in this direction, and 
some argued that CCPs would have to make signifi-
cant investments to develop the linkages. 
Among those that favored industry consolidation, 
a significant proportion thought the idea of one sin-
gle, pan-European CCP was unrealistic. Concerning 
the optimal number of CCPs, Chan argued that while 
there was significant room for industry consolidation, 
two CCPs were probably better than one. While there 
are significant scale advantages from consolidation, 
the differences between cash and derivatives markets 
are so significant that separate CCPs may be neces-
sary. As a result, Chan argued, it may be necessary to 
forego some potential cost savings of consolidation. 
Trundle (2006) also stressed these market differences. 
With derivatives, there is a time gap between the ini-
tial trade and the settlement of the transaction. This 
gap is the essence of the product, as traders explicitly 
want to take (and manage) position risk. In the cash 
market, the gap is shorter, is incidental to the process, 
and, ideally, could be eliminated. The general impres-
sion was that while there could be potential econo-
mies of scope from combining the cash and derivative 
markets, in practice there may be few cost synergies 
to be realized. 
Finally, Jill Considine (2006) of the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) discussed 
the evolution of the DTCC, which provides clearing 
and settlement services for the U.S. securities markets 
and has subsidiaries that act as CCPs for various seg-
ments of the market.16 She characterized the DTCC as 
a monopoly created by the marketplace—because the 
market wanted a monopoly to take advantage of in-
dustrywide economies of scale in the clearing and 
settlement of the cash securities market. While being 
careful to emphasize that different considerations 
came into play in determining the structure of the 
DTCC than those for the European markets, she not-
ed that the cost savings from consolidation were sig-
nificant. These occur in the form of collateral savings 
and other standard processing efficiencies, as well as 
at the periphery in the form of reduced business con-
tinuity and technology costs. Considine emphasized, 
however, that consolidation in these markets was in-
dustry driven and was not the result of a mandate by 
industry regulatory forces. 
As is perhaps evident from the preceding discus-
sion, the most significant disagreement at the confer-
ence concerned the appropriate role of regulators and 
policy setters in “assisting” industry consolidation. The 
current push toward CCP consolidation in Europe was 
originally encouraged by statements from the European 
Commission.17 Therefore, it was no surprise that con-
ference participants were looking forward to the com-
ments of Mario Nava of the European Commission. 
Nava (2006) began by stating that he would not pres-
ent a new directive from the Commission aimed at a 
further integration of European clearing and settlement 
institutions and instead discussed limitations to the 
Commission’s ability to have influence in this area. 
He discussed the role of the Commission in in-
dustry structure issues and the scope of competition 
rules. The internal market rules of the Commission 
are intended to encourage competition and allow it to 
intervene in cases of anti-competitive behavior. While 
the rules may address the framework for a pro-com-
petitive environment, the Commission cannot set up 
new institutions. Most importantly, Nava explained, 
the Commission does not have the power to establish 
a single CCP. Rather, it will rely on other means such 
as competition and moral suasion to achieve its goals. 
He stressed that the industry should critically evalu-
ate its options and move forward, with full consolida-
tion and interoperability offered as current alternatives. 
Nava described interoperability as pragmatic, although 
it may not bring the level of efficiency associated 
with full consolidation. The Commission’s “interven-
tion role,” if there is indeed such a role, would be to  4Q/006, Economic Perspectives
assist the industry by facilitating movement toward 
the industry’s choice of outcomes. 
Exchange & CCP relationships and governance
In the U.S., there has been a recent movement 
away from the traditional model of mutual ownership 
of exchanges and their clearing and settlement provid-
ers, toward a for-profit, stock ownership.18 The move-
ment could have a potential impact on the incentive 
structure and, possibly, the risk aversion of the orga-
nizations. Similarly, since 2001, there has been a robust 
dialogue within the European Union on adequate gov-
ernance arrangements for central securities deposito-
ries and CCPs for two reasons. First, there is concern 
that vertical integration of stock exchanges with depos-
itories and clearinghouses in a vertical silo may im-
pede integration across national borders. The European 
markets aspire to ensure open access to financial mar-
ket clearing and settlement services, regardless of the 
nationality of the participant.19 Thus, structures that 
hinder open access would not be in line with European 
Union policies. Second, there has been significant de-
bate in Europe as to what extent governance is a tool 
that can ensure appropriate management of service 
providers that combine a wide range of services hav-
ing different risk profiles in the same legal entity. At 
the conference, this discussion of governance focused 
on two issues: the relationship between exchanges and 
CCPs, and the perceived advantages and disadvantag-
es of the mutual governance model.
Tomoyuki Shimoda (2006) of the Bank of Japan 
discussed the relationship between exchanges and the 
CCPs that serve them. He stressed the need for close 
communications and cooperation when dealing with 
exposure control, the monitoring of participant posi-
tions, and price movements. Exchanges and the CCPs 
that serve them are normally both interdependent (for 
example, the number of contracts is a source of reve-
nues for both parties, since they have the same partic-
ipants) and complementary (it may be possible to reduce 
the costs for participants if exchanges and CCPs 
jointly monitor the common members). However, he 
expressed concerns about situations where there may 
be potential conflicts between the exchange and the 
CCP. For example, if an exchange is the monopolist 
owner of the CCP, conflicts may arise if the financial 
resources for risk management of the exchange and 
the CCP are pooled.
The recent rush toward demutualization and public 
listing has resulted in more complex situations involv-
ing potential conflicts among the various stakeholders 
in exchanges and the CCPs that support them. Shimoda 
illustrated this potential for conflicts by relating recent 
events involving the Osaka Stock Exchange. Follow-
ing public listing of the exchange, an investment fund 
acquired a large position and ultimately became the 
exchange’s largest shareholder (10 percent of the cap-
ital). The investor then sought a “cashing out” of the 
financial resources held by the CCP for use in case of 
a member default. A cashing out of the resources used 
by the CCP to mitigate counterparty risks would have 
reduced the market’s ability to absorb the losses and 
would have transferred the cost of losses to members 
of the exchange through the loss-sharing arrangement. 
This case brought to the attention of the Japanese reg-
ulators the need for what has been called an “optimal 
degree of intimacy” among different stakeholders 
when designing the governance mechanisms of ex-
changes and CCPs. 
While there can be a number of governance 
models for exchanges and CCPs—nonprofit, mutual 
ownership, for profit, and hybrids of these models—
the main advantage typically associated with the mu-
tual governance model is that the users have a long-term 
interest in the viability of the institution and are less 
likely to sacrifice those interests for short-term gains. 
This is sometimes thought to ensure that financial 
markets operate in line with public policy objectives. 
Concerns are sometimes expressed that moving away 
from this governance model may make the alignment 
of public and private concerns more difficult. However, 
even with the mutual governance model, Lee (2006) 
argued that there are numerous practical obstacles in 
the application of governance rules and that the pur-
ported benefits of the model may not be realized.
For example, often there are strict confidentiality 
requirements for the members of the governing boards 
of exchanges and CCPs. They are not supposed to 
share confidential information, nor are they to make 
decisions based on their own self-interests. However, 
since board members are often users of the exchanges 
and CCPs they govern, inherent conflicts arise. Addi-
tionally, Lee questioned whether it is possible to achieve 
the goal of reflecting the diversity of the user commu-
nity in its governing board, noting that such boards 
typically have only 20 to 25 members. Alternatively, 
a board of 20 to 25 members can have practical prob-
lems in decision-making, particularly when the very 
nature of the business necessitates an understanding 
of many technical details to evaluate policy implica-
tions of such decisions. However, board members 
may tend to have a strategic vision of the business 
rather than detailed knowledge of the technical aspects 
of the business. These strategic and technical needs 
can be very difficult to reconcile. Lee therefore stressed 
that the differences across governance models may  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
not be as great as implied by the theory. There are dif-
ficulties in each model. This is somewhat consistent 
with Taylor’s view that CCP behavior and performance 
are not necessarily driven by the ownership structure 
of the firm. 
Risk management 
Risk management may be the single most impor-
tant function of CCPs, because they are a substitute for 
active risk evaluation and management by users of the 
CCP. As the markets evolve, there are issues as to how 
effective current risk-management procedures are and 
how the cost of these processes may change in light of 
projected changes in the structure of the CCP industry. 
Papers presented at the conference aimed to describe 
the current state of the art in CCP risk management 
and to address some of these projected changes. 
One session presented research evaluating the 
use of collateral and margins in the securities and 
settlement industry. Froukelien Wendt (2006) of De 
Nederlandsche Bank described the role of margin,  
the various types of margins collected by CCPs with-
in their risk-management frameworks, the current use 
of intraday margins in Europe, and the costs and ben-
efits of intraday margin. 
Replacement cost risk is the risk that a counter-
party to a transaction will default before final settle-
ment has occurred. Since the CCP is the counterparty 
to each transaction, it is exposed to the cost of replac-
ing the original transaction at current market prices. 
Because prices may have changed since the contract 
was originated, the CCP could suffer a loss when it 
fulfills its side of the contract. To manage replacement 
cost risk, CCPs require member firms to deposit col-
lateral or margin. Initial margin is set to cover poten-
tial future losses on open positions and is typically 
based on calculations of the greatest loss that the po-
sition could sustain. Variation margin calls are periodic 
supplements to manage risk that bring the margin back 
into line with recent changes in market prices, and 
Wendt argues that they are typically made at the end 
of the day. In her definition, the variation margin can 
be held at the CCP (actually collateral to supplement 
initial margin) or passed through from trading losers 
to winners.20 She discussed the increasing use of intra-
day margin calls that allow the CCP to offset replace-
ment risk and position changes on a timelier basis. 
Wendt identified three types of potential intraday 
margin: a routine intraday margin call (similar to the 
end of day call), a nonroutine call that is triggered by 
a significant price change, and a nonroutine call that 
is triggered by a significant position change by a par-
ticular trading member (that is, the trigger is quantity 
driven). The major benefit of an intraday margin call 
is to enable the CCP to better manage counterparty 
risk by reducing it in a timely manner and/or to allow 
for the early detection of a troubled member. It may 
also better align collateral with the trading patterns 
and resulting exposure of day traders. Additionally, 
since traders are maintaining margin in line with the 
risks they pose to the CCP, they are bearing the addi-
tional costs of holding their positions. Such arrange-
ments should decrease moral hazard, since traders have 
risk-management incentives that are consistent with 
the interests of the CCP and the market as a whole.21 
However, these benefits come at a cost. The CCP 
will have to put systems in place that allow for the 
prompt determination of positions and margin needs. 
Similarly, the members must have facilities in place 
to obtain the necessary funding to satisfy the call and 
back-office procedures in place to verify their posi-
tions and reconcile any discrepancies. 
Wendt noted that all European CCPs currently 
have the authority and operational capacity to initiate 
an intraday margin call on a nonroutine basis, and more 
are moving toward having a routine intraday call. 
While she described the routine call as an industry 
best practice, she said it may not be optimal for all 
CCPs. There are associated costs and benefits from 
putting procedures in place, and each arrangement 
should be carefully analyzed for the net benefits of 
initiating this change. 
Next, Alejandro García of the Bank of Canada 
and Ramo Gençay (2006) of Simon Fraser University 
discussed how they combined statistical methods with 
risk measures to determine how best to value collat-
eral, particularly to protect against unexpected market 
events. Accurate valuation is important because there 
is delay between the time the collateral is pledged 
and the time when it has to be sold to cover losses.  
In the interim, the collateral can change value and to 
account for this possibility, haircuts are placed on the 
value of the collateral. García and Gençay focused on 
the tradeoff between requiring additional (costly) col-
lateral as a result of increasing the haircut and the re-
sulting lower risk associated with an extreme (tail) 
event because of the additional collateral. Their work 
evaluates commonly used practices to calculate the 
haircuts and finds favor with extreme value theory, 
arguing that it leads to efficient haircuts and adequately 
accounts for events that could significantly affect the 
value of the collateral. 
The researchers’ goal is to develop a measure of 
the risk–cost frontier that indicates the tradeoff be-
tween the probability of an extreme tail event occur-
rence and the increased costs associated with holding 10 4Q/006, Economic Perspectives
additional collateral. To develop the measure, García 
and Gençay used alternative measures of the cost of 
risk—measured as value at risk (VaR) and expected 
shortfall (the average loss given that the VaR has been 
exceeded, also noted as ES)—and alternative distri-
butional assumptions concerning the returns on the 
assets. Extreme events are in the tails of the distribu-
tion, and past studies have shown that the assumption 
of normally distributed returns probably understates 
the true probability of the extreme events. To account 
for this, the authors use extreme value theory, which 
allows for a return distribution with “fat tails.” They 
then do a comparison using the alternative return dis-
tributions and different measures of the cost of risk—
VaR or ES. Using simulated equity returns data, they 
find that using extreme value theory results in accu-
rate risk measures when using either VaR or ES. Thus, 
extreme value theory leads to efficient measures of 
haircuts that adequately reflect the risk derived from 
the tail of the return distribution. 
Additional analysis using real data from the  
Canadian airline industry produced similar results.  
In future research, they intend to extend the analysis 
to cover portfolios of collateral instead of individual 
securities and to analyze the valuation of debt instru-
ments for extreme events. 
The final paper in this session was by John Cotter 
of University College Dublin and Kevin Dowd of 
Nottingham University and was in the same vein as 
García and Gençay. However, Cotter and Dowd (2006) 
focused on the choice of a risk measure and the result-
ing characteristics of the measure. The risk measures 
considered include VaR, ES, and the spectral risk 
measure (SRM). Moving from VaR to ES allows the 
model to take into account additional information by 
calculating the average loss once the VaR is exceed-
ed. Going still further, the SRM allows the model to 
take into account the degree of risk aversion of the 
users—that is, the attitude toward losses. It could do 
this by placing different weights (greater, for example) 
on higher losses further out in the tail of the loss dis-
tribution. Thus, a clear expected pecking order emerges, 
with ES being preferred to VaR, and SRM estimators 
better in principle than the ES. 
The authors applied the analysis to real data on 
heavily traded futures contracts—S&P500, FTSE100, 
DAX, Hang Seng, and the Nikkei225—from 1991 to 
2003. Somewhat surprisingly, they find all risk measures 
lead to similar estimates. The S&P500 and FTSE100 
contracts appear to be the least risky and the Hang 
Seng the most risky contract. The VaR and ES estimates 
have fairly similar degrees of precision, but SRM es-
timators were found to be somewhat less precise. 
The discussant for this session, Jean-Charles  
Rochet of the University of Toulouse, praised the au-
thors for providing clear descriptions of current state-
of-the-art risk-management approaches. However, he 
argued that he would like to see a clearer conceptual 
framework for evaluating the alternative measures. Is 
there a means to determine how to optimally combine 
different risk-management tools, such as margin require-
ments, clearing funds, and capital? How are risks and 
costs traded off? And how is it optimally done with  
a multiple tool set? He stressed the need for a more 
comprehensive optimization process that should take 
into account all relevant parties and not just the clear-
ing service providers. 
Another session evaluated the implications of al-
ternative CCP risk-management arrangements in light 
of recent industry innovations. John P. Jackson and 
Mark J. Manning (2006) of the Bank of England con-
sidered the potential impact of two distinct trends in 
the clearing arena: an expansion in the range of prod-
ucts cleared via CCPs and the recent trend toward CCP 
industry consolidation. They approached the problem 
by constructing an analytical framework that expands 
upon the central idea of earlier work by Baer, France, 
and Moser (2004) that collateral has a cost that must 
be incorporated when deciding on optimal risk-man-
agement procedures. They then simulate the implica-
tions of the industry moving from a single product, 
bilateral clearing arrangement to a multiproduct, mul-
tilateral clearing arrangement for replacement costs 
and risk.
To summarize their results, moving from bilateral 
to multilateral netting results in significant decreases 
in risk and costs. Benefits increase, but at a decreasing 
rate, as the number of members in the clearing arrange-
ment increases. Margin-pooling benefits are also real-
ized when multiple assets are cleared through a single 
CCP. The extent of the risk reduction is shown to de-
pend on the variance and covariance of price changes 
and trading positions in the assets held. Finally, the 
benefits of consolidation were found to increase more 
if margin was set on a portfolio basis instead of an as-
set-by-asset basis. Applying data from LIFFE (London 
International Financial Futures Exchange) on open 
interest in the EURIBOR (Europe Interbank Offered 
Rate) and FTSE100 futures contracts, their analysis 
shows that the expected replacement cost losses were 
20 percent lower when contracts cleared through sep-
arate CCPs were consolidated into one. 
Finally, Rajna Gibson and Carsten Murawski 
(2006) of the Swiss Banking Institute emphasized the 
distinct difference in the performance of exchange-
traded derivatives and OTC derivative products. 11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
While exchanges have not recently experienced nota-
ble credit events, the same cannot be said of OTC 
market products. On the surface, they suggest that it 
appears that risk-mitigation mechanisms used by the 
exchanges have been relatively more effective than 
those used in the OTC market. In general, however, 
the authors argued that the impact of risk-mitigation 
mechanisms is not fully understood and needs to be 
more fully analyzed. To initiate that analysis, they 
evaluate the affect of various mechanisms on market 
liquidity, default risk, and the wealth of market par-
ticipants. The risk-mitigation procedures considered 
include initial margin, initial margin plus variation 
margin, and initial and variation margin combined 
with a CCP arrangement. 
The authors conducted their analysis within a  
dynamic model of swap contracts where all market 
participants are hedgers—thus, there are no specula-
tors to add liquidity to the market. Banks are given an 
initial endowment and use the funds to trade deriva-
tives contracts with each other to hedge the price risk 
to their initial endowment. Given the complexity of 
the model with numerous nonlinearities, the model is 
analyzed via simulations. While the model is an ab-
straction from actual markets, it is thought to capture 
the features of derivatives markets. These features in-
clude significant market concentration, significant 
credit exposures in derivatives contracts, participants’ 
requirement to pledge cash as collateral, and a zero 
capital requirement to cover default risk exposure for 
contracts supported by a CCP. 
The analysis is conducted in a period of extreme 
stress when risk-mitigation mechanisms are deemed 
to be most needed. Under these conditions, the authors’ 
analysis indicates that default rates actually increase 
as risk-mitigation efforts are increased. Introducing 
initial margin generates perverse effects as it increases 
default severity (losses given default). Having margin 
combined with a central counterparty tends to reduce 
loss-given default but, in some cases, impairs a bank’s 
ability to hedge and, on net, has negative consequenc-
es for the bank’s wealth. Thus, the authors conclude 
that default-risk-mitigation mechanisms might have a 
negative effect on wealth at times when market par-
ticipants expect them to be most valuable. 
The discussant for this session, James Moser of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, raised 
issues related to the assumptions employed in the 
modeling of risk-mitigation behavior. However his 
major point was one directed at market regulators. 
There is frequently a tendency to believe that, with-
out regulators, exchanges would be slow to respond 
to risks. In fact, Moser’s research finds exactly the 
opposite result, that is, the market responds relatively 
quickly to mitigate risks. This does not occur because 
exchanges are more risk averse, but rather because 
the inclination to manage risk results from an interest 
in increasing trading volumes. Thus, it is in the interest 
of the exchanges to mitigate risk. Firmly establishing 
the self-interest of exchanges adds to the credibility 
of their risk-mitigation efforts and affects policy choices. 
Research, such as the two papers in this session, can 
be seen as attempts to identify and begin to under-
stand the linkages between trading activities and the 
risk-management practices of exchanges. 
Conclusion
One goal of the conference was to bring together 
policymakers, researchers, and industry practitioners 
to engage in a multidisciplinary discussion of key legal, 
risk-management, and public policy issues relating to 
central counterparty clearing arrangements. Toward 
that goal, the participants debated how these struc-
tures might best evolve to meet the clearing and set-
tlement needs of the dynamic and growing financial 
markets around the world. 
Another goal of the conference sponsors was to 
encourage further research concerning the clearing 
and settlement of payments, with special interest in 
risk-mitigation processes. Thus, there was an attempt 
to bring together top researchers in this area to discuss 
their current work and explore the potential for future 
research. The conference clearly succeeded in gather-
ing together in one place researchers who have done 
seminal work in this area. This was evident in John 
Jackson’s comments about the state of the economic 
literature concerning CCPs. Looking at the audience 
and his fellow panelists, Jackson noted “…. you’re all 
here!” Whether the conference promotes further re-
search in this area remains to be seen. The sponsors 
are hopeful that it will. 1 4Q/006, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1The Clearing Corporation, formerly known as the Board of Trade 
Clearing Corporation, was the clearinghouse for the Chicago Board 
of Trade until the creation of the “common clearing link” for the 
Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  
2As further discussed later in this article, it is imperative that the 
substitution of the CCP for each of the counterparties be legally 
binding. This is often achieved via a process known as novation. 
3The complete program is included in appendix 2. Additional infor-
mation, including drafts of some of the presentations, is available 
at www.ecb.int/events/conferences/html/ccp.en.html
4For discussions of the historical evolution of clearing and settle-
ment arrangements, see Moser (1994, 1998), Kroszner (2000), and 
Schaede (1991). 
5More accurately, it has exposure to each clearing member of the 
CCP. Traders that are not members of the CCP must have their 
trades cleared by clearing members. 
6Haircuts are discounts applied to the market value of securities 
that have been posted as collateral.
7See Koeppl and Monnet (2006).
8See for example, Considine (2001). See also Baer and Evanoff 
(1991) for a discussion of netting in payments more generally.
9Bliss and Papathanassiou (2006) stressed the problems associated 
with legal uncertainty and the efforts in both the U.S. and Europe 
to address the concerns. 
10See appendix 3 for the Bank for International Settlements, 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (CPSS–IOSCO) best practice recommendations  
for CCPs. 
11While not disputing the point, Rubin Lee (2006) of the Oxford 
Finance Group made the argument that he thought that concerns 
about the systemic risk associated with clearing and settlement in-
stitutions were “exaggerated.”
12See Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (2004). The 
Task Force was jointly established by the Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the central banks of the Group 
of Ten countries and the Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
13The push for consolidation in Europe is exemplified in comments 
by McCreevy (2005) and joint statements by AFEI/Assosim/FBF/
LIBA/SSDA (2005, 2006). The 2006 statement is exceptionally far 
reaching and calls for “…the imposition of the unbundling of the 
vertical silos if private stakeholders do not start the process on their 
own” [italics added].
14Broadly speaking, Gisler and Taylor took positions consistent 
with the former group, and Giovannini and Chan with the latter. 
15See, for example, Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987) and 
Evanoff and Israilevich (1995).
16The National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) acts as a 
CCP for broker-to-broker equity, corporate bond and municipal 
bond, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trust (UIT) 
trades in the U.S.; the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC) 
acts as a CCP for government securities and certain mortgage-
backed securities; and the Emerging Markets Clearing Corporation 
(EMCC) acts as a CCP for emerging market securities.
17See McCreevy (2005) and joint statements of AFEI/Assosim/ 
FBF/LIBA/SSDA (2005, 2006).
18CCPs are typically associated with exchange-traded products.  
However, there has been a recent push to move OTC contracts to 
CCPs when the characteristics of the products allow it; for example, 
when products are sufficiently standardized. The conference dis-
cussion covered some of these issues, but most of the discussion 
concerning a (non-CCP) facility introduced by the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation to help in administrative issues, 
such as trade confirmation, matching, assignment, and reconcilia-
tion. See the comments of Peter Axilrod (2006) of the DTCC.
19The Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments of 2004 has 
already required this for CCPs (2004/39/EC).
20Wendt uses the term to describe the funds that are paid by a clearing 
member to settle any losses resulting from price changes, indepen-
dent of whether the funds are maintained at the CCP or are passed 
through to the members profiting from the price change. However, 
whether the funds are held or passed through by the CCP has im-
plications for its ability to manage member defaults.  
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APPENDIX 2:  ISSUES RELATED TO CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING  
  JOINT CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND  
  THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO  
 
Monday, April 3, 2006
Opening Remarks: Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank  
Panel 1 Setting the Context
Chair: Patrick M. Parkinson, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Diana Chan, Citigroup   
Yvon Lucas, Banque de France  
Tomoyuki Shimoda, Bank of Japan 
John Trundle, Euroclear SA/NV  
Lunch
Keynote Speech: Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  
Invited Session I
CCP Foundational Issues
Chair: Robert Steigerwald, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Derivatives clearing, central counterparties and novation: the economic implications  
Robert Bliss, Wake Forest University, and Chryssa Papathanassiou, European Central Bank   
Central counterparties  
Thorsten Koeppl, Queen’s University, and Cyril Monnet, European Central Bank 
Discussant: Charles Kahn, University of Illinois 
Invited Session II
Collateral and Margins
Chair: Douglas Evanoff, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Intraday margining of central counterparties: EU practice and a theoretical evaluation of benefits and costs 
Froukelien Wendt, De Nederlandsche Bank 
Valuation of collateral in securities settlement systems for extreme market events   
Alejandro García, Bank of Canada, and Ramo Gençay, Simon Fraser University 
Extreme spectral risk measures: an application to futures clearinghouse margin requirements 
John Cotter, University College, Dublin, and Kevin Dowd, Nottingham University 
Discussant: Jean-Charles Rochet, University of Toulouse  
Conference Dinner  
Dinner Speech: Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, Italy, and  
Former Member, Executive Board, European Central Bank    
Tuesday, April 4, 2006
Panel II
Industry Structure and Developments
Chair: Alberto Giovannini, Unifortune Asset Management SGR 
Peter Axilrod, The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation   
Daniel Gisler, Eurex  
David Hardy, LCH.Clearnet Limited  
Kimberly S. Taylor, Chicago Mercantile Exchange  1 4Q/006, Economic Perspectives
Session III
CCP Risk Management
Chair: Jens Tapking, European Central Bank 
Comparing the pre-settlement risk implications of alternative clearing arrangements
John P. Jackson and Mark J. Manning, Bank of England
Default risk mitigation in derivatives markets and its effectiveness      
Rajna Gibson and Carsten Murawski, Swiss Banking Institute 
Discussant: James T. Moser, Louisiana Tech University and Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Lunch
Keynote Speech: Michael Moskow, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago   
Panel III
CCPs and the Future Development of Financial Market Clearing and Settlement
Chair: Daniela Russo, European Central Bank      
Jill Considine, The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation     
Ruben Lee, Oxford Finance Group  
Mario Nava, European Commission      
Concluding Remarks: Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Central Bank  
APPENDIX 2:  ISSUES RELATED TO CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING  
  JOINT CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND  
  THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO (CONTINUED)
APPENDIX 3:  CPSS–IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL  
  COUNTERPARTIES (CCPS) 
 
CPSS–IOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties (CCPs)
1. Legal risk
A CCP should have a well founded, transparent, and enforceable legal framework for each aspect of its activities in all rele-
vant jurisdictions.
2. Participation requirements
A CCP should require participants to have sufficient financial resources and robust operational capacity to meet obligations 
arising from participation in the CCP. A CCP should have procedures in place to monitor that participation requirements are 
met on an ongoing basis. A CCP’s participation requirements should be objective, publicly disclosed, and permit fair and 
open access.
3. Measurement and management of credit exposures
A CCP should measure its credit exposures from its participants at least once a day. Through margin requirements, other 
risk-control mechanisms or a combination of both, a CCP should limit its exposures to potential losses from defaults by its 
participants in normal market conditions, so that the operations of the CCP would not be disrupted and participants that are 
not in default would not be exposed to losses that they cannot anticipate or control.
4. Margin requirements
A CCP that relies on margin requirements to limit its credit exposures to participants should have sufficient margin require-
ments to cover potential exposures in normal market conditions. The models and parameters used in setting margin require-
ments should be risk based and reviewed regularly.1 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
5. Financial resources
A CCP should maintain sufficient financial resources to withstand a default by the participant to which it has the largest ex-
posure in extreme but plausible market conditions.
6. Default procedures
A CCP’s default procedures should be clear and transparent, and they should ensure that the CCP can take timely action to 
contain losses and liquidity pressures and to continue meeting its obligations. Key aspects of the default procedures should 
be publicly available.
7. Custody and investment risks
A CCP should hold assets in a manner whereby risk of loss or of delay in its access to them is minimized. Assets invested by 
a CCP should be held in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.
8. Operational risk
A CCP should identify sources of operational risk and minimize them through the development of appropriate systems, con-
trol, and procedures. Systems should be reliable and secure and have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity plans 
should allow for timely recovery of operations and fulfillment of a CCP’s obligations.
9. Money settlements
A CCP should employ money settlement arrangements that eliminate or strictly limit its settlement bank risks, that is, its 
credit and liquidity risks from the use of banks to effect money settlements with its participants. Funds transfers to the CCP 
should be final when effected.
10. Physical deliveries
A CCP should clearly state its obligations with respect to physical deliveries. The risks from these obligations should be 
identified and managed.
11. Risks in links between CCPs
A CCP that establishes links either cross-border or domestically to clear trades should evaluate the potential sources of risks 
that can arise, and ensure that the risks are managed prudently on an ongoing basis. There should be a framework for coop-
eration between the relevant regulators and overseers.
12. Efficiency
While maintaining safe and secure operations, CCPs should be cost-effective in meeting the requirements of participants.
13. Governance
Governance arrangements for a CCP should be effective, clear and transparent to fulfill public interest requirements and to 
support the objectives of owners and users. In particular, they should promote the effectiveness of the CCP’s risk-manage-
ment procedures.
14. Transparency
A CCP should provide market participants with sufficient information for them to identify and evaluate accurately the risks 
and costs associated with using its services.
15. Regulation and oversight
A CCP should be subject to transparent and effective regulation and oversight. In both a domestic and an international con-
text, central banks and securities regulators should cooperate with each other and with other relevant authorities.
Sources: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group of Ten 
countries (CPSS) and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2004, exhibit 1.
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